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SUBSTANTIVE VALIDITY CHALLENGES UNDER THE
PENNSYLVANIA MUNICIPALITIES PLANNING
CODE: THE PRACTITIONER AND THE
NEW PROCEDURES
BENJAMIN N. HENSZEYt AND BENJAMIN NOVAKtt
I. INTRODUCTION
N 1972, THE PROCEDURES governing the litigation of substan-
tive validity challenges to zoning ordinances were significantly
changed by amendments to the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning
Code (MPC). 1 These amendments have altered the procedures in
substantive validity challenges in three fundamental respects: first,
they have created a more complex set of applications which must be
filed and requirements that must be met in order to commence a chal-
lenge; second, they have created for the challenging landowner a choice
of forums to hear and decide the challenge initially; and third, they
have drastically changed the respective roles of the courts,2 zoning
hearing boards, and municipal governing bodies in validity challenges.
It is the purpose of this article to examine the implications of these
changes for the practitioner who must be aware of the statutory and
jurisdictional requirements for initiating a challenge, for the land-
owner who must select a forum for the challenge, and for the municipal
solicitor who should be aware of the various strategic and tactical
possibilities which flow from the challenger's choice of forum.
t Assistant Professor of Business Law at The Pennsylvania State University.
B.A., Williams College, 1961; J.D., Dickinson, 1964.
ti Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. B.A., The Pennsylvania State University,
1965; J.D., Georgetown, 1968.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (1972), amending Act of July 31,
1968, No. 247, [1968] Pa. Laws 805.
2. Even prior to the 1972 amendments, several decisions by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania had already initiated a trend toward greater judicial involvement in
zoning matters. See National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment,
419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) ; Concord Twp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765
(1970); Beaver Gas. Co. v. Osborne Borough, 445 Pa. 571, 285 A.2d 501 (1971).
See also cases cited in note 63 infra.
(187)
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Prior to the 1972 amendments to the MPC, the procedure for
filing validity challenges was relatively simple. The MPC provided
that only a court of law could decide a challenge to the validity of a
zoning ordinance on the merits.' Such challenges could be initiated
at any time before the court, or before the zoning hearing board.
4
However, in the latter case, the zoning hearing board acted only as
a hearing master to take testimony and make findings on contested
issues of fact ;5 the power to decide the ultimate issue of the validity
or invalidity of the challenged ordinance was expressly withheld from
the zoning hearing board by the MPC.6 Prior to the new procedures,
the governing body had no place in the process of validity challenges;
however upon notice that such a challenge had been filed, the governing
body could have acted within 60 days to render the challenge moot by
amending the ordinance to meet the challenger's objections.7
The procedures established by the 1972 amendments appear sim-
ple. Under the new procedures, a landowner can challenge the validity
of a zoning ordinance either by filing a challenge with the zoning
hearing board" or, in an entirely new and unique proceeding, by filing
a challenge together with a proposed "curative amendment" with the
governing body of the municipality.' In either case a public hearing
must be held, a record made, and a decision rendered on the validity
of the ordinance." If an adverse decision on validity is rendered by
3. See Unger v. Hampton Twp., 437 Pa. 399, 263 A.2d 385 (1970). In Unger,
the court explained the role of the zoning hearing board prior to the 1972 amendments
to the MPC:
Section 910, read in its entirety, evinces a legislative intent to preclude the
board from making a determination of the legal validity of the ordinance; it
appears that the legislature believed the resolution of a legal challenge of this
sort would be better made initially by a court. But the section does not
eliminate all functions of the board in such appeals; rather, it transforms the
function into one of fact-finding, preparatory to a court determination as to
validity.
Id. at 405-06, 263 A.2d at 389, construing Act of July 31, 1968, No. 247, § 910,
[1968] Pa. Laws 841, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10910 (1972).
4. Act of July 31, 1968, No. 247, § 910, [1968] Pa. Laws 841, as amended,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10910 (1972).
5. Unger v. Hampton Twp., 437 Pa. 399, 405-06, 263 A.2d 385, 389 (1970).
6. The Municipalities Planning Code, prior to the 1972 amendments, provided
in pertinent part: "[T]he board shall have no power to pass upon the validity of
any provision of an ordinance or map adopted by the governing body." Act of July
31, 1968, No. 247, § 910, [1968] Pa. Laws 841, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 10910 (1972).
7. Act of July 31, 1968, No. 247, § 802(2), [1968] Pa. Laws 837, as amended,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11006 (1972).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(1) (a) (1972). The board conducts a
hearing pursuant to section 908 and makes findings in accordance with sections 910
or 913.1 of the MPC. Id.; see id. §§ 10908, 10910, 10913.1.
9. Id. § 11004(1)(b).
10. See notes 42-44 and accompanying text infra.
[VOL. 21 : p. 187
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either the zoning hearing board or the governing body, an appeal can
be taken to the court of common pleas which has the power to review
the decision of the zoning hearing board or governing body." How-
ever, as actual cases have arisen and as the intricacies of the new
procedures have become apparent, it is clear that a Pandora's box of
problems, alternatives, and possibilities has been opened to challenging
landowners, municipalities, and the courts.
II. THE FORM OF THE CHALLENGE
Section 1004 of the MPC sets forth the basic procedure for
instituting a challenge to the substantive validity of a zoning ordinance.
Before proceeding to the complex question of where the challenge
should be filed, the requirements of the form of the challenge before
each available forum should be examined.
To initiate a challenge under section 1004, the landowner must
file a written application, the specific requirements of which are set forth
in the statute: 1) "a written request to the board or governing body
that it hold a hearing on his challenge" ;12 2) "a short statement reason-
ably informing the board or the governing body of the matters that
are in issue and the grounds for the challenge"; 3 3) "[t]he request
shall be accompanied by plans and other materials describing the use
or development proposed by the landowner in lieu of the use or develop-
ment permitted by the challenged ordinance or map.' 4 If the chal-
lenge is submitted to the zoning hearing board under section 1004(1)
(a), the above three submissions are sufficient. If, however, the chal-
lenge is to be submitted to the governing body under section 1004(1)
(b) as a "curative amendment request" a fourth item must be sub-
mitted in addition to the above three: 4) "an amendment or amend-
ments to the ordinance proposed by the landowner to cure the alleged
defects therein."' 5
The written application containing the items listed above is
crucially important to a successful application for two reasons: first,
it institutes the challenge and establishes the jurisdiction of the boara
or governing body, and later the court to decide the challenge on the
merits; and second, it establishes the parameters of relief to be granted
to the landowner. 6 The importance of these requirements and the
reasons for them cannot be overemphasized - the field is strewn with
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(3) (1972).
12. Id. § 11004(2) (a).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 11004(2)(c).
15. Id. § 11004(2)(d).
16. See notes 59-68 and accompanying text infra.
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cases in which the courts have never reached the merits due to the
parties' failure to comply with the application requirements."
Prior to the enactment in the 1972 amendments of the statutory
application requirements, the field of zoning litigation was not one
to which the subtleties of pleading were common. The present pro-
visions of the MPC relating to variances, 8 special exceptions,"9 or
even appeals from the zoning officer,20 contain no such requirements.
The new procedures for substantive validity challenges, however, have
become the answers to a scrivener's prayer. The courts have consistently
held that the form of the challenge determines the jurisdiction of the
governing body or zoning hearing board to entertain the challenge
initially, and the jurisdiction of the court on appeal.
For example in Board of Supervisors of Ferguson Township v.
Strouse," one of the first appellate cases involving the curative amend-
ment procedures, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that
its jurisdiction to hear the case was premised solely upon the existence
of a challenge which fully complied with the procedural provisions
of the MPC.2 2  Similarly, in Greensburg Planning Commission v.
Cabin Hills, Inc.2" a challenge was summarily dismissed on the ground
that it was a simple request for rezoning; the court noted that had
the landowner initiated the challenge in the prescribed manner, the
lower court would have had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case on
the merits.24 In Phelan v. Zoning Hearing Board of Lower Merion
Township,25 compliance with the application requirements of section
1004 was similarly demanded in a challenge directed to a zoning
hearing board.26
In Rallis v. Supervisors of College Township,27 the court sus-
tained a municipality's preliminary objections to an appeal, holding
17. See notes 21-29 and accompanying text infra.
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10912 (1972).
19. Id. § 10913.
20. Id. § 10909.
21. 16 Pa. Cmwlth. 143, 328 A.2d 177 (1974).
22. Id. at 147, 328 A.2d at 179.
23. 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 324, 339 A.2d 594 (1975).
24. Id. at 326 n.2, 339 A.2d at 595 n.2; see Penn Twp. Bd. of Supervisors v.
DeRose, 18 Pa. Cmwlth. 626, 339 A.2d 859 (1974), where the court, relying on section
1001, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11001 (1972), held that the only avenues open to a
landowner seeking to challenge the substantive validity of a zoning ordinance are to
submit the matter to the zoning hearing board for report or to the governing body for
an amendment to the ordinance under § 1004(1) (b). The former course of action was
attempted by plaintiffs; however, the court found that the applicants had "failed to
follow the proper procedure under either method." 18 Pa. Cmwlth. at 629, 339 A.2d
at 860.
25. 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 63, 339 A.2d 612 (1975).
26. See text accompanying notes 51-54 infra.
27. 10 CENTRE COUNTY LEGAL J. 505 (C.P. Centre County 1975).
[VOL. 21 : p. 187
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that the form of -the original application did not comply with section
1004. The court conveyed the rationale of its holding in terms which
clearly manifest the importance of complying with the application
requirements and the triumph of procedural form over content:
While we feel quite certain that both parties involved knew
and understood what the appellants were attempting to challenge,
nevertheless we feel it better strategy for the appellant to comply
strictly with the newly established appellate court guidelines so
that when the issue is finally determined it will not be bottomed
on a technical point.28
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has described the ef-
fect of the new procedures in more eloquent terms:
[T]he battleground between those who would build apartments
and those who would resist their construction has shifted from
the heights of constitutional debate ... to the beachheads of local
administrative procedures. This case also illustrates the im-
portance to persons engaging in zoning litigation of careful atten-
tion and adherence to the comprehensive procedural provisions
of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code. 9
In light of these warnings and results, this article will examine
in detail each of the requirements for an application to initiate a sub-
stantive validity challenge.
A. The Request for Hearing
The request for hearing must be in writing and must request
that the governing body or zoning hearing board, as the case may be,
hold a hearing on the challenge."0 The zoning hearing board is granted
the authority to hold hearings by section 910 of the MPC,8' which
sets forth the board's functions in validity challenges,8  or according
to section 913.1, 33 which would allow a non-zoning issue to also be
heard by the board where the board already has jurisdiction under
28. Id. at 507.
29. Larwin Multihousing Pa. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 181, 183,
343 A.2d 83, 84 (1975) (citations omitted). It is provided in 1004(2) (a) that the
request for the amendment must include notice to the governing body that the
landowner is challenging the validity of the existing ordinance. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 11004(2) (a) (1972). When the landowner is proceeding under section
609.1 the hearing is both on the curative amendment and on the challenge to the
constitutionality of the ordinance; it is for this reason that section 1004(2) (e)
provides that the notice of the hearing "shall include notice that the validity of the
ordinance or map is in question." Id. § 11004(2) (e).
30. PA. STAT. ANI. tit. 53, § 11004(2) (a) (1972).
31. Id. § 11004(1) (a).
32. Id. § 10910.
33. Id. § 11004(1)(a).
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section 910."4 Section 910 also provides that the hearing itself shall
be conducted in accordance with section 90835 which sets forth certain
requirements to be followed by the board in the taking of evidence
and 'the production of a record. If the challenge is directed to a
governing body, the hearing would be held according to section 609.1"6
of the MPC.37 Only subsections 4 through 8 of section 908 governing
the conduct of hearings are applicable to hearings before the governing
body.
The submission of a written request for hearing on the validity
challenge is -the first step in invoking the provisions of section 1004
before the zoning hearing board or the governing body. Its fundamental
importance lies in providing notice that a challenge is being made.
It is of vital importance to a governing body to know whether the
requested rezoning is a simple petition to legislative wisdom or whether
it is a challenge to the validity of an ordinance.38  In the case of a
simple request for rezoning, although the governing body must hold
a hearing before voting on the amendment, 9 there are no time limits
within which a decision must be rendered,4" and neither action nor
failure to act on the part of the governing body is reviewable. 41 How-
ever, if a validity hearing is requested, the governing body is required
to hold a public hearing on the challenge within 60 days, 42 must
provide that a stenographic 'record be made of the hearing,43 and may
render a decision on the rezoning within 30 days of the hearing; a
failure to act within 30 days will constitute a denial of the request
for a curative amendment. 44 The denial of the challenge by the govern-
ing body is then reviewable by the appropriate court of common
pleas.45
A request for hearing, directed to a zoning hearing board, serves
to distinguish a challenge to the substantive validity of an ordinance
34. Id. § 10913.1.
35. Id. § 10908.
36. Id. § 10609.1.
37. Id. § 11004(2)(b).
38. See Appeal of Merlino, 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 143, 339 A.2d 642 (1975); Board of
Comm'rs v. Beho Dev. Co., Inc., 16 Pa. Cmwlth. 448, 332 A.2d 848 (1975); Board of
Supervisors v. Strouse, 16 Pa. Cmwlth. 143, 328 A.2d 177 (1974).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609 (1972).
40. See Morrisville Bank v. Township of Falls, 20 Pa. Cmwlth. 149, 152-53,
341 A.2d 258, 259 (1975).
41. Greensburg Planning Comm. v. Cabin Hills, Inc., 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 324, 339
A.2d 594 (1975).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10609.1, 11004(2) (f) (1972).
43. Id. §§ 10609.1, 10908(7).
44. Id. § 11004(3).
45. Id. § 11004(3). If the proposed curative amendment is not adopted, the
landowner may submit the validity challenge to the zoning hearing board for a de novo
hearing rather than appeal to the court of common pleas. Id.
[VOL. 21 : p. 187
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss2/1
1975-1976] SUBSTANTIVE VALIDITY CHALLENGES
from a variance request.46 It also determines what time periods are
applicable, since the zoning hearing board must render a written deci-
sion within 45 days after the last hearing before the board or officer
in ,the case of a variance request,4 7 and within 60 days after the request
is filed for hearing in the case of a challenge to the validity of an
ordinance.
4
B. The Grounds of the Challenge
The request for a hearing on the validity challenge must contain
"a short statement reasonably informing the board or governing body
of the matters that are in issue and the grounds for the challenge."49
The wording of this requirement in the MPC unquestionably
makes it possible to be read as a fundamental pleading requirement
which must be filed by the challenger at the outset, binding him or
her to the grounds originally asserted."0 No case has yet directly ad-
dressed the issue of whether a challenger will be bound by the grounds
initially stated within the request for hearing, nor has any decision
resolved the -problem of whether grounds of invalidity which become
apparent during the course of a hearing, but which were not asserted
by the challenger in the initial application may be recognized.
Phelan v. Zoning Hearing Board of Lower Merion Township51
dealt with a closely related issue. In Phelan, the applicant had re-
ceived a cease and desist order from the township zoning officer which
he appealed to the zoning hearing board along with a request for a
variance. During the course of his testimony, the applicant also con-
tended that the zoning ordinance in question was discriminatory. The
zoning hearing board sustained the order of the zoning officer and denied
the variance, but stated that it could not rule on the validity of the ordi-
nance because the challenge had not been made in the manner required
by the MPC."2 The court of common pleas -reversed the zoning hearing
46. See Phelan v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 63, 339 A.2d 612 (1975).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10908(9) (Supp. 1975).
48. Id. § 11004(2)(f) (1972).
49. Id. § 11004(2) (a).
50. The identical wording also appears in section 1005 of the MPC, which
establishes the procedure in substantive validity appeals by persons aggrieved by a use
or development permitted on the land of another. Id. § 1005. There is a strong
argument that a landowner would have a right to enforce the requirement upon such
persons to state the grounds of the challenge, and to hold an aggrieved person to
the grounds stated in the initial challenge under section 1005. Of course, if the
requirement is held to be applicable to the protester in section 1005(a), the same
requirement would logically be binding upon a landowner challenging the substantive
validity of an ordinance under section 1004(2) (a).
51. 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 63, 339 A.2d 612 (1975).
52. Id. at 66, 339 A.2d at 614.
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board, and held the ordinance unconstitutional.5" On appeal, the
commonwealth court reversed the lower court and upheld the zoning
hearing board's refusal to decide the validity challenge on the basis
that the application requirements of section 1004(2) had not been
met by the challenger's oral assertion that the ordinance was unconsti-
tutional. 4 Thus the court seems to have held that a validity challenge
cannot be commenced except by formal application, which includes the
statement of the grounds of the challenge and the matters in issue. 55
Of course, it is vitally important for zoning hearing boards, and
especially governing bodies, to know what procedures are being invoked
by citizens, and what relief is 'being requested. It is submitted, however,
that formal pleading requirements should not be utilized to exclude
otherwise sufficient challenges to the validity of a zoning ordinance.
Since the vast majority of zoning actions are instituted and heard
without the presence of attorneys, it would seem better policy for
attorneys, courts, and zoning bodies to direct their attention as much
as possible to the merits of each case, penalizing the parties for pro-
cedural errors only when clearly prejudicial to the other party or when
necessary for the hearing body to maintain its dignity and integrity.
C. Plans for Proposed Development
The third requirement56 for completing an application in a sub-
stantive validity challenge is set forth at length in the statute:
The request shall be accompanied by plans and other mate-
rials describing the use or development proposed by the landowner
in lieu of the use or development permitted by the challenged
ordinance or map. Such plans and other materials shall not be
required to meet the standards prescribed for preliminary, tenta-
tive or final approval or for the issuance of a permit so long as
they provide reasonable notice of the proposed use or development
and a sufficient basis for evaluating the challenged ordinance or
map in the light thereof. Nothing contained herein shall preclude
the landowner from first seeking a final permit or approval before
submitting his challenge to the board or governing body.5
53. Id. at 66-67, 339 A.2d at 615.
54. Id. at 69, 339 A.2d at 616.
55. In two cases arising under section 1005, a similarly worded section of the
MPC, the courts have strictly construed the requirement that the notice of appeal
from a zoning hearing board's decision to a court of common pleas must include
a statement which concisely sets forth the grounds on which the appellant relies. The
court held in both cases that a failure to specify any grounds of appeal warrants
dismissal of the appeal. Lyons v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 20 Pa. Cmwlth. 165, 168,
340 A.2d 585, 586 (1975); Kreitz v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 4 Pa. Cmwlth. 602,
608-09, 287 A.2d 884, 887 (1972).
56. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2) (c) (1972).
[VOL. 21 : p. 187
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The preparation of detailed architects' plans can be an expensive
undertaking for a landowner, especially when the risk that the plans
will never be utilized is great. Therefore, the statute requires only
such plans as would give the zoning hearing board or governing body
reasonable notice of the proposed development and an adequate basis
to review the ordinance in light thereof.58
However, in addition to providing the governing body with a
set of plans against which to measure the applicability and validity
of the ordinances, the plans also furnish a basis for relief if the land-
owner is ultimately successful in the challenge, at least in exclusionary
zoning challenges. Since the case of Girsh Appeal,59 which granted
definitive relief to a landowner who had successfully challenged an
ordinance, -the importance of the plans and proposals submitted with
a challenge has grown from a simple requirement of pleading to the
fundamental prayer for relief. Section 1011(2)61 of the MPC pro-
vides that when a court finds a zoning ordinance to be unlawfully
restrictive it may order that the landowner be permitted -to develop
the land in accordance with the plans which Were submitted with the
challenge. The MPC vests a great deal of discretion in the courts to
determine whether the landowner's plans should be approved in full or in
part and whether the municipality should be permitted to impose any
restrictions on the development which the court has ordered approved.
One court discussing section 1011 has stated:
[O]nce the court has concluded that -the zoning ordinance unlaw-
fully prohibits or restricts the landowner's proposed development,
then the landowner should be permitted to proceed with his
proposed development subject to those reasonable zoning regula-
tions, restrictions and codes applicable to the class of usage pro-
posed by the land developer.62
58. Id.
59. 437 Pa. 237, 240, 263 A.2d 395, 396 (1970).
60. See Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., -- Pa. -' 328 A.2d 464, 468 (1974),
citing Order No. MP-12,271 (Pa. Sup. Ct., August 29, 1972), enforcing Girsh Appeal,
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) ; see note 63 infra.
61. PA. STAT. ANN tit. 53, § 11011(2) (1972). Section 1011(2) provides:
If the court finds that an ordinance or map or a decision or order thereunder
which has been brought up for review unlawfully prevents or restricts a develop-
ment or use which has been described by the landowner through plans and other
materials submitted to the governing body, agency or officer of the municipality
whose action or failure to act is in question on the appeal, it may order the
described development or use approved as to all elements or it may order it
approved as to some elements and refer other elements to the governing body,
agency or officer having jurisdiction thereof. for further proceedings, including
the adoption of alternative restrictions, in accordance with the court's opinion
and order.
Id. (emphasis added).
62. Appeal of Olson, 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 514, 522, 338:A.2d 748, 752 (1975).
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It is clear from both statutory and case law63 that ,the relief
granted to the challenging landowner is to be based upon the plans
which were submitted by the landowner when the challenge was in-
stituted.
If a landowner successfully challenges the validity of an ordinance,
and it is invalidated by the zoning hearing board, or by the court on
appeal from the board or governing body, -the only bases of relief
are the plans and proposals submitted with the landowner's challenge.6 4
If the governing body acknowledges the invalidity of its ordinance, it
may grant relief by adopting the requested curative amendment;65
however, if -the governing body adopts an amendment to its ordinance
which is different in any way from the requested amendment, the issue
of the validity of the adopted amendment can be measured only by how
it affects the challenger's proposed plans.66
Of course, if the challenge is originally submitted to the zoning
hearing board, a curative amendment is not required. 7 In this context
the board, or the court on appeal, may consider only the legality or
the constitutionality of the municipality's zoning ordinance; if it is
found to be invalid, the court may order specific relief by permitting
the challenger to develop his or her land as proposed in the "plans and
other materials" submitted with the challenge.6"
63. The Supreme Court has held that when an ordinance is found invalid due
to its exclusionary effect, the challenging landowner should be permitted to develop the
land in accordance with the proposed plans. Township of Williston v. Chesterdale
Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466, 468-69 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1975) ; Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
-_ Pa. _, 328 A.2d 464, 469-70 (1974). This form of relief was first formulated
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in an order issued in 1972, subsequent to a
decision which ruled the zoning ordinance of Nether Providence Township un-
constitutional because it failed to provide for apartment buildings within the
municipality. Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 240, 263 A.2d 395, 396 (1970). After
the township excluded the Girsh tract from the area rezoned for apartment use,
the landowners petitioned the court for enforcement of its decision. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ordered that petitioners be granted a building permit upon their
compliance with the township's building code. Order No. MP-12,271 (Pa. Sup. Ct.,
August 29, 1972), enforcing Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), and
cited in Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., --- Pa. _, 328 A.2d 464, 468 (1974).
[Editor's Note] Although the challenges involved in these cases were instituted prior
to 1972, it is submitted that they were actually decided in light of the 1972 amendments.
See Township of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., supra at 468-69; Casey v. Zon-
ing Hearing Bd., supra at . 328 A.2d at 467 n.6, 468 & n.10, 469-70. While Casey held
that a landowner successfully challenging an ordinance would not be deprived of
meaningful relief, the court recognized that such relief could be granted only to the
extent that it is reasonable. Id. at ___, 328 A.2d at 469.
64. Gorski v. Township of Skippack, 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 346, 351, 339 A.2d 624, 627
(1975).
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10609 (1972).
66. See Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Pa. Cmwlth. 116,
340 A.2d 909 (1975).
67. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2) (a)-(d) (1972).
68. Appeal of Olson, 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 514, 522, 338 A.2d 748, 752 (1975); see
notes 56-58 and accompanying text supra.
[VOL. 21 : p. 187
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Two problems however, remain unresolved by the courts. First,
while the requirement of providing plans and proposals for development
may not impose a great burden on the large land developer, in other
situations it may be a procedural burden. Professor Krashowiecki
has noted the inequities that may be created by this requirement:
[C] onsider cases where, for example, the plaintiff is a widow who
merely wants to sell her land most advantageously (that is, without
a certain restriction imposed by an ordinance) to a friend who
wants to hold it for investment purposes. Such plaintiffs may be
required to present to the court some plans and some evidence
concerning an alternative development.6 9
In this situation, the same commentator maintains that the requirement
of providing plans and proposals for development cannot be justified,
unless "the protection of the Constitution extends only to landowners
who can demonstrate that they are prepared to develop the land
immediately.
'70
The Rallis case7 ' provides an example of another facet of the same
problem. Although it is not stated in the lower court's opinion, that
case involved a piece of land which was expected to be condemned for
a state highway.72 Obviously its zoning, as far as use was concerned,
was irrelevant, since no landowner would have planned a new struc-
ture on it. However, it was subject to a rezoning by the municipality
which substantially reduced its value for condemnation purposes. The
landowners clearly stated this in their request for a curative amendment
in which they sought to restore the previous zoning. The court, how-
ever, held that the application was not complete.73 In such a case, what
type of plans could a landowner submit?
A second problem involving plans is the extent to which they
may exceed the restrictions of the challenged ordinance. In Kaufman
& Broad, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of West Whiteland Township"
this issue was raised by a landowner who challenged the ordinance
alleging that it excluded townhouses, condominiums, and fourplexes;
the municipality stipulated that the ordinance was "unconstitutionally
exclusionary when applied to townhouses."7 The landowner, how-
69. Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the New Pennsylvania Procedures,
120 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1058 (1972).
70. Id. at 1059.
71. See text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra.
72. The authors reside in State College Borough and were apprised of the
status of the land which was the subject of the challenge in Rallis.
73. 10 CENTRE COUNTY LEGAL J. at 507.
74. 20 Pa. Cmwlth. 116, 340 A.2d 909 (1975).
75. Id. at 120, 340 A.2d at 911.
1975-1976]
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ever, had submitted plans describing its proposed use of the land as a
planned residential development (PRD), including townhouses, four-
plex units and recreational facilities; its curative amendment proposed
that the ordinance be amended to include PRDs.76 The court noted
that while "[i]t would .... seem unjust to allow [the landowner] to
develop its land in this manner, '7 7 the rule established in Ellick v.
Board of Supervisors of Worcester Township75 governed this situation:
"A municipality with the defective ordinance runs the risk
that a landowner will successfully challenge the ordinance and be
permitted to proceed with a development which may be quite
contrary to the intent of the governing body, its defective ordi-
nance and the comprehensive plan."
'79
Thus the curative amendment submitted by the challenging landowner
"need not strictly confine itself to merely remedying the allegedly uncon-
stitutional provisions . . . ,, ;so relief may not be determined by the defect
challenged, but by the plans submitted, even if -such plans do not relate
to the alleged defect. Thus it would appear that the large developer's
search for defects in a zoning ordinance may conceivably provide the
challenger with a developmental carte blanche. In practice, however,
the challenger's ability to obtain authorization for his or her plans is
circumscribed by the notion that any proposed use of the land must be
reasonable. The Kaufman court adopted the following formulation of
the proper procedures to be undertaken by the governing body in the
event that there is a successful challenge to the validity of a zoning
ordinance under section 1004:
[I]f a governing body determines that its ordinance is defective,
because it totally prohibits the use proposed by the challenging
landowner, then the governing body must permit the challenging
landowner to develop his land as proposed in the "plans and other
materials" submitted with the challenge, provided, of course, that
what is submitted is reasonable, and not injurious to the public
health, safety, welfare and morals.8'
76. Id. at 119, 340 A.2d at 910.
77. Id. at 125, 340 A.2d at 913.
78. 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975).
79. 20 Pa. Cmwlth. at 125, 340 A.2d at 913-14, quoting Ellick v. Board of
Supervisors, 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 404, 417, 333 A2d 239, 247 (1975).
80. Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Pa. Cmwlth. 116, 122,
340 A.2d 909, 912 (1975) (emphasis supplied by the court). The court observed,
however, that considering the circumstances of the case, the landowner's PRD
proposal was overly broad, and that a proposed curative amendment merely providing
for townhouses would have been much more appropriate. Id.
81. Id. at 124-25, 340 A.2d at 913, quoting Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17
Pa. Cmwlth. 404, 411-12, 333 A.2d 239, 244 (1975) (emphasis added).
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Rather than determining the extent to which the landowner should be
granted approval of his plans the court remanded the case to the court
of common pleas. The lower court was directed to have the municipal
governing body determine whether fourplex units were permitted within
the township, and to otherwise "exercise its [the court's] broad super-
visory powers of review over the submitted plans."
8s2
In order for a landowner to fully exploit a successful challenge,
it would appear that the plans should be drawn to encompass each
desired use of the challenger's land, :but they must not be so broad as
to be deemed unreasonable.
8 3
D. The Curative Amendment
The requirements of the fourth item8' which must be submitted
to complete a landowner's application to commence a validity chal-
lenge before the governing body raise more questions than do the
other items. For this reason, a discussion of the confusion which the
curative amendment procedure first created, and the court decisions
which have attempted to explain it, is particularly appropriate. This
will be followed by a discussion of specific problems posed in the draft-
ing and submission of the curative amendment as part of an application
to a governing body.
5
The confusion which has resulted from the adoption of the cura-
tive amendment procedure has been derived from several different
sources. Practitioners, municipalities, and courts have all understood
the basic nature of a validity challenge, which is nothing more than an
allegation that the ordinance is in some manner unconstitutional. If
the 1972 amendments to the MPC had merely granted to the zoning
hearing boards the power to both hear and decide in the first instance
all validity challenges, there would have been few problems. However,
the Pennsylvania legislature decided to create two alternative proce-
dures and forums to hear validity challenges. The confusion was to be
expected.
Besides its novelty, among the foremost reasons for confusion
surrounding the new curative amendment procedure were two mis-
conceptions relating to its purpose. The first misconception arose from
the conclusion that because the new procedure provided a new remedy,
its also must have created a new right which this remedy was designed
to enforce, or recognized a new wrong which it was designed to cor-
82. Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Pa. Cmwlth. 116, 128,
340 A.2d 909, 915 (1975).
83. See notes 61 & 62 and accompanying text supra.
84. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2) (d) (1972).
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rect. The second misconception was an extension of the logic of the
first. Failing to find any new right created or wrong defined in the
amended MPC, commentators and practitioners alike suggested that
the curative amendment procedure provided a wide-open avenue for
raising a challenge to any zoning ordin'ance merely by requesting a
rezoning."0 If the governing body rezoned in a manner unacceptable
to the landowner, or failed to rezone to his or her satisfaction upon
request, the new procedure suggested itself as a way to obtain judicial
review of the entire zoning process. Even Professor Ryan, in his
authoritative treatise, stated the -same conclusion when he commented
that as a result of the 1972 amendments to the MPC, a landowner
"now has the option to present a plea for rezoning to the governing
body, and appeal an adverse decision directly to the Court of Common
Pleas.""7
In theory, at least, the new curative amendment procedure was
not predicated upon the creation of new rights, nor upon the recogni-
tion of new wrongs. It was not designed to create new grounds upon
which to attack -the zoning process; substantive zoning law was to
remain as before.88 The only new element was that the landowner was
offered an alternative forum in which to initiate a validity challenge.
Where the landowner chose to submit a challenge to -the governing
body, that body would then have a chance to exercise first review of
its own ordinance and to correct any defects without resort to judicial
or quasi-judicial process.
What then is a curative amendment? One court has described a
curative amendment as "merely an offer or suggestion to the governing
body which will aid it in any attempt it may desire to make to cure a
defective ordinance."'8 9 It appears that the curative amendment must
be submitted as a separate document;9° the practitioner must decide
what is to be the scope or breadth of its content. Clearly, the curative
amendment should be worded so that if the governing body adopts it,
the developer can utilize the land in conformity with the proposed
plans. On the other hand, according to the theory advanced in Ellick,
86. R. RYAN, PENNSYLVANIA ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.1.3 (1974).
87. Id. Although no changes were made in the text of section 9.1.3, Professor
Ryan has supplemented the original text, adding several new sections explaining the
procedures before municipal governing bodies. In discussing curative amendment
applications, Professor Ryan acknowledged that, despite the "sometimes confusing
innovation" and "rather cryptic language" of section 1004 of the MPC, the principles
involved in validity challenges had not been changed by the 1972 amendments. Id.
§§ 9.6.1-.6.6 (Supp. 1976).
88. Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 404, 410, 333 A.2d 239, 243
(1975).
89. Id. at 415, 333 A.2d at 246.
90. Board of Commn'rs v. Beho Dev. Co., Inc:, 16 Pa. Cmwlth. 448, 452 n.2, 332
A.2d 848, 851 n.2 (1975).
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if the governing body proceeds in a manner unacceptable to the land-
owner, or refuses to enact a curative amendment, and the matter is
appealed to the courts, the curative amendment is not at issue before
the court." The court will decide only the validity of the zoning ordi-
nance and if decided favorably to the landowner, the court may then
grant specific and definitive relief to the challenger based upon the
challenger's proposed plans.92 In light of this result, it would seem
that once the governing body refuses to act favorably on the curative
amendment proposal offered by the landowner, its scope or content
would no longer be of any importance. Nevertheless, the scope or content
of the curative amendment may plague the challenger throughout sub-
sequent litigation, and indeed could ultimately defeat the validity
challenge. To illustrate, consider the following problem. A landowner
has a one-acre lot in a residential neighborhood completely surrounded
by a large number of single-family homes in a district zoned for such.
The landowner reviews the local zoning ordinance and discovers that
it does not provide for apartment buildings anywhere in the munici-
pality. The landowner then develops plans to build a multi-family, 10-
story apartment building on his or her lot, and submits a challenge to
the governing body along with a curative amendment which suggests
that the lot be rezoned for apartment uses. The municipality, recog-
nizing the exclusionary nature of its ordinance, adopts the landowner's
curative amendment, and also amends its ordinance to allow apartment
uses in certain designated districts.
Unfortunately, the landowner's acreage is not contiguous to any
of the districts designated for apartment use, and the challenger's land
now constitutes a small island of high-density, multi-family use in a
district of low-density, residential use. One might conclude that the
zoning ordinance adopted pursuant to the curative amendment proce-
dure results in spot zoning. While there is no provision in the MPC
for "persons aggrieved" or protesters93 to appeal directly to a court
from the adoption of a curative amendment under section 1004, the
landowner may face a challenge from neighboring landowners who
could attack, pursuant to section 1005,"4 the validity of the newly
91. 17 Pa. Cmwlth. at 415, 333 A.2d at 246.
92. Appeal of Olson, 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 514, 522, 338 A.2d 748, 752 (1975)
Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 404, 415-16, 333 A.2d 239, 246
(1975).
93. The authors utilize the term "protestors" to mean "persons aggrieved" within
the language of section 1005 of the MPC. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11005 (1972);
see note 137 infra.
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11005 (1972). Section 1005 provides in pertinent part:
Persons aggrieved by a use or development permitted on the land of another
by an ordinance or map or any provision thereof who desire to challenge its
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adopted curative amendment as spot zoning.15 The neighboring land-
owner and any other persons aggrieved by the construction of the
apartment building may bring their challenge to the newly adopted
zoning scheme before the zoning hearing board.16 The dilemma thus
created would not have existed had the original challenging landowner
drawn the curative amendment to permit apartment buildings in the
entire original R-1 district, rather than creating a new district of the
lot for apartment uses. The lesson for the practitioner is simply that
the governing body's adoption of, a curative amendment which is
drawn too narrowly may result in a Pyrrhic victory.
In drafting a curative amendment proposal, the practitioner must
exercise a great deal of caution, for an overly broad proposal may also
cause problems for the challenger. For instance in Kaufman, the govern-
ing body had refused to accept the plans or the proposed curative amend-
ment of the challenger.97 Despite extensive quotations from Ellick to
the effect that on appeal " 'the curative amendment is no longer a viable
matter at issue before the court,' "98 the Kaufman court carefully
analyzed the scope and the subject matter of the challenger's curative
amendment. The court found that the landowner had been "excessive
by his curative amendment,"'9 and since the landowner's curative
amendment submission was "overbroad,"' the court stated that it
could not order its adoption.' 01
It appears, therefore, that an overly broad proposal may have the
effect of prejudicing the court against the merits of an otherwise valid
challenge, and thus may adversely affect the court's decision concerning
adoption of the landowner's plans as submitted. Care must be exercised
in the preparation of a proposed curative amendment. The amendment
must be drafted so that it neither invites a counter challenge should the
governing body adopt it, nor invokes the disapproval of a higher court
if it is not adopted by the governing body.
validity on substantive grounds shall first submit their challenge to the zoning
hearing board for a report thereon under section 910.
Id.
95. See, e.g., Pollock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, - Pa. Cmwlth. ___, 342
A.2d 815 (1975).
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11005 (1972).
97. 20 Pa. Cmwlth. at 119, 340 A.2d at 910.
98. Id. at 124, 340 A.2d at 913, quoting 17 Pa. Cmwlth. at 415, 333 A.2d at 246.
99. 20 Pa. Cmwlth. at 122, 340 A.2d at 912.
100. Id. at 123, 340 A.2d at 912. The court qualified its conclusion regarding the
scope of the curative amendment by stating that "we of course are not setting any
absolute limits for these submissions, as we believe that there is a definite need for
flexibility in these cases." Id. at 122, 340 A.2d at 912 n.6.
101. Id. at 123, 340 A.2d at 912.
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III. CHOICE OF FORUM
An important aspect of the 1972 amendments to the MPC is their
creation of a choice of forums in which to initiate a validity challenge.
The challenge may be presented to an appointed quasi-judicial body,
the zoning hearing board, or may be directed to the very legislative
body which enacted the ordinance that is the subject of the challenge." 2
Due to the diverse charactertistics of these two forums, the decision
concerning the initial forums involves significant legal and tactical
ramifications for the landowner, the municipality, and the protester.
A. Applicable Time Periods
The first consideration as to the choice of forum in validity chal-
lenges is whether certain time periods set forth in the statute have been
made applicable by the denial of an application for a permit or an
approval. Generally, a substantive validity challenge may be made at
any time after an ordinance or map takes effect' 0l In the normal
situation, therefore, the landowner may carefully prepare a case for
presentation to whichever forum the landowner believes will be most
receptive to the challenge. Section 1004(2) (b) requires, however, that
if the landowner's application for a zoning permit, or for tentative
approval of development plans has been denied, a challenge must
be made within the same time period as is provided for an appeal
from the denial, that is, within 30 days. 104 If the denial of the permit or
approval is not challenged within that time period, all future rights to
raise a substantive validity challenge to that restriction will be lost.
In addition to the time limit for filing a challenge after the denial
of a permit or approval, there is a second time limit to consider. Upon
the filing of a challenge to the validity of an ordinance, section
1004 (2) (f)' 05 provides that the zoning hearing board or the governing
body must conduct a public hearing on the challenge within 60 days
of the submission of the challenge. While the landowner may request
or consent to an extension of time,'0 6 the denial of his or her request
for a permit nevertheless commences the runing of these two time
periods. For a landowner who feels that the time provided by these
102. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004 (1972); see notes 8-9 and accompanying
text supra.
103. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2) (b) (1972).
104. Id. § 11006(2). In Phelan v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 63,
339 A.2d 612 (1975), one of the several deficiencies found by the court in the
landowners' case was their failure to meet the specified time restrictions. Id. at 69-70,
339 A.2d at 616.
105. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2) (f) (1972).
106. Id.
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periods is not sufficient for the adequate preparation of his case, the
choice of forums may be crucial. This is due to the different ramifica-
tions involved in the initiation of a challenge in the different forums. If
the challenge is submitted to the zoning hearing board, the board's deter-
mination must be accepted or be appealed through the courts on the
record made before the zoning hearing board, and on such additional evi-
dence as a court of common pleas may be persuaded to accept.1"7 This is
not the situation, however, where the challenge has been filed under
section 1004(1) (b) as a curative amendment. Section 1004(3) pro-
vides that failure to appeal the denial of a request for a curative amend-
ment does not preclude the landowner from presenting the same ques-
tions concerning the validity of the ordinance in a new action before
the zoning hearing board."' 8 Section 1004(3) thus offers the curative
amendment procedure to the landowner as a way of meeting the time
periods triggered by the denial of a permit or approval without being
permanently prejudiced by surprise. It meets the requirement of action
within 30 days triggered by the denial, but does not commit the
challenger to the choice of appealing an adverse decision to court or
losing the right of appeal.
In addition to providing a convenient method for the timely filing
of a validity challenge, the curative amendment procedure provides
other procedural advantages. It is the ideal solution for the landowner
who is hesitant about investing in a validity challenge which may
ultimately progress all the way through the courts. The landowner
may wish to take advantage of the opportunity to conduct a "dry-run"
by presenting the challenge to the governing body. If, after presenta-
tion the landowner's case appears favorable, but the curative amend-
ment is refused by the governing body, the landowner then has the
option of taking an immediate appeal to court.10 9 If, however, the
challenge does not appear as though it will prevail, or if other difficulties
confront the developer, such as a loss of financing, the challenger may
choose not to appeal an adverse decision to court, and a wait either
better preparation of the case, or better circumstances to present the
case de novo to the zoning hearing board at a later time.
The governing body should be aware of this possibility. If a
challenger fails to present a successful case for any reason that could
be corrected in a second hearing of the case, the challenger may elect
to bring a new challenge and may eventually prevail before the zoning
hearing board.
107. Id. § 11010.
108. Id. § 11004(3).
109. Id.
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Thus, for the landowner who for any reason does not want to
make a major commitment to litigation, the curative amendment pro-
cedure is the preferable choice, and the governing body is the preferable
forum in which to file the challenge. It allows the landowner the
flexibility not only to attack the ordinance, but also, if the landowner
does not prevail, to retire from the field and attack it another day.
However, if the landowner has decided upon an all-out fight to the
finish at the time the challenge is filed, there are other considerations
which should be taken into account in choosing a forum as will be
discussed in subsequent sections of this article.
B. Validity Challenge or Variance Request?
The second consideration as to choice of forum in validity chal-
lenges requires an analysis of the grounds for the challenge. The crucial
inquiry is whether the grounds of the landowner's challenge could
possibly be construed by a court at a later date as a variance request.
If so, a landowner who files a subsequent validity challenge under
section 1004 may risk having the case eventually dismissed, after the
investment of considerable time and expense, for having chosen the
wrong remedy. The choice of proper forum relative to the distinction
between validity challenges and variance requests will be dependent
upon the direction along which the present analysis of the courts will
proceed.
Within a short period of time after the adoption of the 1972
amendments to the MPC, the confusion discussed earlier in this article
concerning the uses of the curative amendment procedure" had
spawned a rash of challenges to municipal governing bodies. Imperative
from the beginning, therefore, was a need to choose, or at least to
narrow, the wide-open avenue which practitioners and commentators
perceived in the new curative amendment procedure."'
The first task which the commonwealth court set out to achieve
was a clarification of the use of the curative amendment procedure to
distinguish between variance requests and validity challenges. In the
first case to arise under the new amendments, Township of Neville v.
110. See notes 84-88 and accompanying text supra.
111. One lower court pointed out:
[W]e note with some distress the apparent excesses exhibited by developers in
the pursuit of selfish interests by way of attacks upon the constitutionality of
local zoning ordinances. There has been a rash of so-called "curative amend-
ments" presented to local governing bodies, thrust upon the municipalities, we
believe, as a means to secure indirectly that which should be sought directly.
Sullivan v. Lower Makefield Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 26 BUCKS Co. L. REP. 279, 282
(1975).
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Exxon Corporation,112 the court set forth (but failed to hold) what
the authors believe to be the true basis of distinction between validity
challenges and variance requests:
The variance function delineated in sections (sic) 912 of the MPC
is exclusively a function of the zoning hearing board. As the
appeal here was from the denial of a curative amendment by a
"governing body" under section 1004, the court was without
authority to grant the variance."
3
This statement of the law, clearly setting forth the differences
between variance requests and validity challenges based on the juris-
diction of the zoning hearing board and the jurisdiction of the govern-
ing body was not, unfortunately, followed in the Neville case or offered
as a basis for decision in the cases which followed it. Instead, the
court had introduced a different and potentially more confusing
rationale under which validity challenges made with or in the context
of variance requests have been or may be dismissed.
In a series of recent cases the courts have repeatedly stated that
variance requests and substantive validity challenges are "mutually
exclusive remedies."" ' 4 The first case in this series is Robin Corpora-
tion v. Board of Supervisors of Lower Paxton Township."5 In that
case a landowner instituted a challenge to the governing body alleging
that the zoning of his single tract constituted a confiscation of his
property. The court characterized the landowner's challenge, not as a
substantive validity challenge, but rather as a request for a variance,
since the basis of the landowner's grievance related only to his particu-
lar tract, and not to the facial validity of the ordinance. In denying
the landowner's appeal, however, the court did not advert to the lack
of jurisdiction in the governing 'body to grant relief in the form of a
variance, but instead stated the following rationale for its decision:
[S] ection 1004 "substantive challenges" and requests for variances
are mutually exclusive remedies, a request for a variance being
required whenever a landowner desires to challenge the zoning
of his particular tract through a claim which, if established on
the record, would warrant the granting of a variance." 6
112. 14 Pa. Cmwlth. 225, 322 A.2d 144 (1974).
113. Id. at 230, 322 A.2d at 147 (citations omitted).
114. Robin Corp. v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 386, 332 A.2d 841
(1975) ; Shuttle Dev. Corp. v. Township of Upper Dublin, ___ Pa. Cmwlth. _, 378
A.2d 777 (1975); Phelan v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 63, 339 A.2d 612
(1975).
115. 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 386, 332 A.2d 841 (1975).
116. Id. at 396, 332 A.2d at 847. One lower court in attempting to grapple with
this problem referred to the difference as a "precarious distinction." Perlstein V.
Borough of Monroeville, 123 Pirs. LEGAL 3. 314, 319 (C.P. Allegheny County 1975).
[VOL. 21 : p. 187
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The problem immediately arises as to whether this language in
the court's decision should apply -to all section 1004 validity challenges,
including validity challenges filed to the zoning hearing board under
section 1004(1) (a) or whether it applies only to variance requests
and validity challenges filed to the governing body under section
1004(1) (b). The broad statement in the court's decision is not clear,
and invites analysis.
Variance requests and validity claims are not mutually exclusive
by nature. On the contrary, the court noted in Robin that if the
landowner there had made proper application for his validity challenge
under section 1004, "the substantive principles governing the granting
of relief would closely parallel, if not be identical with the variance
law. '"" 7 Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a case decided
prior to the adoption of the MPC had stated that "a challenge to the
validity of a zoning ordinance is a natural and foreseeable outgrowth
of a request for a variance.""' 8
If variance requests and validity challenges are not by nature
inconsistent, why have they been stated to be "mutually exclusive"?
It is submitted that what the commonwealth court has actually been
striving to achieve is simply to establish the rule that variance claims
may not be made to a governing body. In Robin, the court discussed
the policy reasons for such a rule immediately prior to stating that
variance requests and validity challenges are "mutually exclusive":
[A]llowing a landowner [with a variance claim] to proceed pur-
suant to section 1004 would, as a practical matter, result in the
placing of a great and undue burden on municipal governing
bodies. If the landowner who has what is essentially a variance
claim can short-cut the review process, by-pass the zoning hearing
board, and go directly to the governing body for a disposition, the
usefulness and legislatively intended function of local hearing
boards would be greatly derogated." 9
However, such a policy is already embodied in the MPC on the
basis of jurisdiction. A landowner cannot file a variance request to a
governing body in the guise of a validity challenge for the reason that
only zoning hearing boards have jurisdiction to grant variances. No-
where in the MPC is a governing body authorized to do so. Thus, if
a landowner files a challenge to a governing body, but establishes only
such facts as would entitle him to a variance, the appeal should be
117. Id. at 396 n.7, 332 A.2d at 847 n.7.
118. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504,
512, 215 A.2d 597, 602 (1965).
119. 17 Pa. Cmwth. at 395, 332 A.2d at 847 (footnote omitted).
1975-1976]
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dismissed not because the remedies are mutually exclusive, but because
the governing body has no power to grant the relief, without regard to
the extent to which a landowner may be entitled to a variance.
It is clear, therefore, that a validity challenge to a governing body
excludes proof by the landowner that he or she is entitled to a variance.
But does a variance request exclude an alternative claim before the
zoning hearing board that the ordinance is invalid? The language
used by the court in Robin was not simply that validity challenges to
the governing body excluded variances, but that validity challenges
under section 1004 which includes both the governing body and the
zoning hearing board are mutually exclusive.
A zoning hearing board has jurisdiction to hear and decide both
variance requests and validity challenges. Thus, while there is not a
jurisdictional problem where a landowner files a substantive validity
challenge to the zoning hearing board under section 1004(1) (a), and
also files with it a variance request under section 912, there may still be
a problem of the mutual exclusivity of remedies.' 21 It may be argued
that a request for a variance admits the validity of the ordinance, and
seeks only to vary the application of its restrictions based on hardship.
A validity challenge, of course, denies that there exists a valid ordinance
from which to obtain a variance. The remedies could be held to be
mutually exclusive on the simple basis that it is inconsistent to request
a variance from an ordinance which is alleged to be invalid.
It is submitted, however, that in light of the fact that the substan-
tive principles of variance law and validity challenges are closely
parallel, if not identical, it would be procedurally unnecessary and
burdensome to foreclose an appeal on both grounds as alternative
theories before the zoning hearing board which has jurisdiction over
both. To do so would simply result in successive appeals raising essen-
tially the same issues on presentation of the same evidence. As the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted in a case decided prior to the
adoption of the MPC:
[I]f a request for a variance is denied, indicating that there is
nothing about petitioner's land or his hardship that is any different
than that of everyone else with land similarly zoned, then peti-
120. In one recent case, the court almost reached this issue. In Phelan v. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 63, 339 A.2d 612 (1975), a landowner had clearly
instituted the action before the zoning hearing board as a variance request. At the
hearing, however, he sought to present evidence that the ordinance was unconsti-
tutionally discriminatory. While the court's opinion stated that a validity challenge
may not "be pursued in the context of other kinds of applications, including the
request for a variance," the Phelan court held that the applicant's validity challenge
had not been properly or timely filed, and thus never directly confronted the problem
of pleading in the alternative before the zoning hearing board.
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tioner's most logical next step is to attack the validity of the
ordinance as it applies to everyone. In other words, a challenge
to the validity of a zoning ordinance is a natural and foreseeable
outgrowth of a request for a variance.''
It would, therefore, seem that the most efficient procedure would
be to allow both claims to be heard in a single hearing based upon
alternative theories, rather than requiring them to be raised separately
in successive hearings.
In terms of choice of forum, therefore, it is not clear whether the
court will hold that variance requests and validity challenges filed be-
fore the zoning hearing board are mutually exclusive. Until that is
decided, the municipality has the opportunity to argue that a land-
owner must choose his theory. In any event, it is clear that whatever
rationale the courts proceed under, a landowner whose claim may
after hearing be found to be a variance claim should not file it with
the governing body under section 1004(1) (b), but with the zoning
hearing board under section 1004(1 ) (a).
After having suggested that the substantive principles governing
variances and validity claims are similar, the next logical question is
how they shall be distinguished for the purpose of choosing the proper
forum and procedure to obtain relief. In the Robin case the court
set forth the following distinction:
Section 1004 is the proper section for a landowner to use when
the validity of an entire zoning ordinance is challenged, such as
in the case of an allegation of exclusionary zoning. A request for
a variance pursuant to Section 912 is proper whenever a land-
owner desires to challenge the zoning of his particular tract
through a claim which, if established on the record, would war-
rant the granting of a variance.
1 22
This distinction seems reasonable at first glance. Where one is
challenging a provision of an ordinance which affects everyone (or at
least everyone in the same zoning classification) a validity challenge is
the proper remedy. Exclusionary zoning is the classic case of a facial
challenge to an entire ordinance. On the other hand, if a provision of
the zoning ordinance is not unfair as to others, but affects a particular
tract in a discriminatory and confiscatory manner, the proper remedy
is a variance. But a caveat is in order for the practitioner. The rule
does not apply in all cases.
121. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa.
504, 512, 215 A.2d 597, 602 (1965).
122. 17 Pa. Cmwlth. at 396, 332 A.2d at 847.
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Consider, for example, the problem of spot zoning. Spot zoning
is, by definition, "the arbitrary and unreasonable classification and
zoning of a small parcel of land. '123 If a single lot located in the center
of an industrial park is rezoned 'to R-1, which permits only single-
family detached dwellings, should the landowner request a variance
pursuant to section 912, or file a challenge to validity under section
1004(1) (a) or (1) (b) on the basis of unconstitutional spot zoning?
Clearly the landowner is challenging the zoning ordinance as it applies
to his or her particular tract, :but just as clearly, it is not a typical
variance claim as defined by section 912 of the MPC.
On the other hand, the "validity variance" recognized in the
Neville case affected only a particular tract of land; nevertheless, it
was held to be a proper case for a section 1004 validity challenge. 124
This holding, which was approved by the court in 'the Robin case,125
is especially interesting in light of the fact that the "validity variance"
claim raised in Neville is analogous to the classic "property hardship"
claim which has long been recognized as a traditional basis for a
variance.12 6
There is, however, a common element to these examples which will
define a coherent or at least identifiable exception to the general rule.
Normally, a spot zoning claim is not directed against the physical
restrictions set forth in the ordinance, but to the uses permitted on 'the
land which is spot zoned. And, the relief requested normally is to
be zoned for the same uses as the surrounding land. Similarly, in
Neville, the objection of the landowner was to the uses permitted on
the land as it was zoned, coupled with a request to be zoned according
to a different zoning classification. In both cases, the relief requested
is to use the land for uses permitted in other lawful zoning classifica-
tions of the municipality. For the practitioner, anytime the issue
123. Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 379, 200 A.2d 408, 415 (1964).
124. 14 Pa. Cmwlth. 225, 230, 322 A.2d 144, 147 (1974).
125. 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 386, 393 n.4, 332 A.2d 841, 845-46 n.4 (1975). The court
stated :
[Iln Neville, as in the instant case, relief was sought from a hardship that was
allegedly imposed on a specific tract. Our statement in Neville regarding the
availability of the curative amendment procedure in that case thus represents an
interpretation which is still viable in light of the holdings we make in the
instant case.
Id.
126. See, e.g., Pfile v. Borough of Speers, 7 Pa. Cmwlth. 226, 298 A.2d 598
(1972), where a variance was granted for a property which was zoned for single-
family residence but was subject to a property hardship in that it was surrounded
by Interstate 70 and a ramp with gasoline service stations; and Filanowski v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment, 439 Pa. 360, 266 A.2d 670 (1970), in which a variance was
granted for a lot zoned for single-family residences where the property in question
was subject to a hardship in that it was surrounded by high-rise apartments.
[VOL. 21 : p. 187
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involves a request by the landowner for some other lawful use than
that for which the land is presently zoned, the exception to the rule
must be thoroughly researched to determine whether the claim is a
variance request or a validity challenge.
Thus, in determining the type of claim to file, and the forum in
which to file it, the practitioner must be aware of the fundamental
grounds of the claim. Does the claim involve a single tract or the
entire ordinance, a use or a building restriction, a change of lawful
uses or a prohibited use? Each of these is a factor in determining the
nature of the claim and the forum in which it is filed.
C. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
The third consideration as to choice of forum in validity challenges
involves the matter of which forum makes the findings of facts and
arrives at the conclusions of law. The rules as to these matters are
not the same for zoning hearing boards and governing bodies.
The zoning hearing board is required under section 910127 not
only to hear validity challenges but also to take evidence, make a record
thereon and generally to "make findings on all relevant issues of fact
which shall become part of the record on appeal to the court.'1
28
Section 908(9) of the MPC requires the zoning hearing board to
render a written decision or written findings within 45 days after a
hearing.1
29
The MPC does not, however, establish similar requirements for a
governing body confronted with a validity challenge. While section
908(7) 130 requires both the zoning hearing board and the governing
body to keep a stenographic record of each hearing, section 908(9)
is not applicable to governing bodies."' In addition, the MPC does
not require the governing body to render a decision, written or other-
wise, subsequent to the hearing. In fact, section 1004(4) defines the
governing body's failure to render such a decision within 30 days
after the hearing as a denial of the landowner's request." 2
Since an appeal from a negative decision of a governing body
may thus present the court with a record which is entirely devoid of
any findings of fact, conclusions as to credibility of witnesses, or any
reconciliation of conflicting testimony, both the challenger and the
127. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10910 (1972).
128. Id.
129. Id. § 10908(9) (Supp. 1975).
130, Id. § 10908(7) (1972).
131. See id. § 10609.1.
132. See Hess v. Upper Oxford Twp., 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 399, 402, 332 A.2d 836.
838 (1975) ; notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra.
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municipality must look ahead to who will make the ultimate deter-
mination of the facts -to which the law is applied. The problem was well
described by one appellate court which refused to make findings in
the exact situation in which most common pleas courts will find them-
selves on appeals from validity challenges originally decided by govern-
ing bodies under section 1004( 1 ) (b) :
This Court will not rummage through the record, speculating
upon the credibility and weight of the evidence before a finder of
fact. Nor will we, with one hat on, make our own findings, and
then don our appellate hat to determine whether our decision can
be sustained. 3 '
Section 1010... of the MPC specifically forbids remand of validity
challenges to the governing body for any purpose whatsoever. Thus,
unless there are no contested issues of fact, or unless the lower court
takes additional evidence so that it can judge the credibility and weight
of the testimony, a very large margin for error may exist in validity
challenges instituted before governing bodies pursuant to section 1004
(1) (b). It is suggested that municipal solicitors encourage the govern-
ing bodies to make findings of fact and conclusions in such cases.
However, the fact that a governing body may not assume this task
should be considered by a challenging landowner in a decision as to
choice of forum.
The challenging landowner must also consider the risk involved
in allowing a governing body to utilize the opportunity to make find-
ings of fact and conclusions to justify its own zoning ordinance. If,
for example, a landowner wishes to challenge a certain zoning ordi-
nance as spot zoning, or as exclusionary, alleging that a "token" zone
has been created," 5 it may be wise to file the challenge to the zoning
hearing board, thereby denying the governing body the opportunity to
make findings of fact which would rationalize its previous zoning deci-
sions. Of course, the members of a governing body may testify before
a zoning hearing board as to their reasons for a certain zoning policy,
133. Hess v. Upper Oxford Twp., 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 399, 403, 332 A.2d 836, 838-39'
(1975). The Hess court noted that section 1010 of the MPC precludes a remand
to the governing body in validity challenges under section 1004. Since the court
cannot conduct a review of the governing body's actions without being apprised of
the factual basis for the denial of a curative amendment, the court found that it was
.the duty of the lower court to make appropriate findings of fact where such had
not been supplied by the governing body. These findings may be based either on the
record constructed before the governing body or on additional evidence taken by
the court. Id. at 838.
134. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11010 (1972).
135. See Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466.
(Pa. 1975).
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but unlike the procedure set forth in section 1004(1) (b), they will be
subject to cross-examination, rather than act as finders of fact.Y86
D. Protesters
One factor which must always be considered by a landowner in
asserting a validity challenge is the possibility of protesters'8 7 pro-
longing litigation. In considering a choice of forum, there is one
additional major concern with regard to protesters. Simply put, while
a protester may appeal to court from the decision of a zoning hearing
board in a validity challenge, 8 ' there is no provision for a protester to
appeal directly to the courts from the decision of a governing body to
adopt a curative amendment. A protester wishing to challenge the
substantive validity of the curative amendment adopted may submit
this challenge to the zoning hearing board.1 9 However, once adopted,
the curative amendment will be the beneficiary of all presumptions of
validity, and the protester will carry a heavy burden in attempting to
overcome the presumption.'4"
136. The possibility that a governing body might justify its own zoning ordinance
is illustrated by the court's opinion in DeCaro v. Washington Twp., __ Pa. Cmwlth.
-, 344 A.2d 725 (1975). There, the landowner had challenged a three-acre minimum
lot size requirement in one of the residential zones. The board of supervisors had
filed a report concluding: 1) the property in the challenged zone was suitable for
development as zoned; 2) the land zoned for residential use was sufficient to meet
projected population growth; and 3) sufficient land was zoned for small residential lots
to accommodate the demand therefor. Id. at -, 344 A.2d at 727. In affirming the
lower court's dismissal of the landowner's appeal, the court stated:
[T]he function of the reviewing court is to examine the evidence submitted to
the factfinder to determine whether the result is supported by the facts and the
law. The question is not whether the appellate courts would have reached the
same result, but, rather, whether the factfinder's determination was arbitrary
and contrary to the weight of the evidence.
Id. at _, 344 A.2d at 728. Moreover, in Silver Appeal, '63 Pa. D.&C.2d 408 (C.P.
Bucks County 1973), the court indicated that it may be proper for the governing
body, hearing a validity challenge under section 1004, independently to investigate
and obtain testimony which bears upon the application for a curative amendment. Id.
at 410-13.
137. The authors utilize the term "protesters" to mean "persons aggrieved" within
the meaning of section 1005 of the MPC. See notes 93 & 94 and accompanying text
supra. Township residents aggrieved by a use or development permitted within the
township are aggrieved persons within the meaning of the statute. Raum v. Board of
Supervisors, 20 Pa. Cmwlth. 426, 342 A.2d 450 (1975).
138. Protestors, or aggrieved persons, must be residents of the municipality, and
must have appeared before the zoning hearing board at the hearings concerning the
challenged amendment in order to have standing to appeal the board's decision.
Citizens For A Clean Environment v. Zoning Hearing Bd., __ Pa. Cmwlth...
350 A.2d 419 (1976) ; Cablevision v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 13 Pa. Cmwlth. 232, 320
A.2d 388 (1974).
139. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11005 (1972).
140. See Raum v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Pa. Cmwlth. 426, 342 A.2d 450
(1975).
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E. Ancillary Matters
When an applicant wishes to dispute certain non-zoning issues,
such as building code provisions, as well as make validity challenges,
he or she should consider the effect of new section 913.1 of the MPC
which provides:
Where the board has jurisdiction over a zoning matter pursuant
to -section 909 through 912, the board shall also hear all appeals
which the applicant may elect to bring before it with respect to
any municipal ordinance or requirement pertaining to the same
development plan or development.'
41
Therefore, if .both zoning and non-zoning matters are at issue,
the landowner has two choices. First, the landowner may elect to
submit a validity challenge to the zoning hearing board instead of to
the governing body so as to have both the zoning and non-zoning
matters heard in a single hearing. Second, the landowner may elect to
submit the validity challenge to the governing body under section
1004(1) ('b). If the latter is preferred, three choices remain as to the
non-zoning matters: first, the landowner may file a separate action
directly in court, perhaps in the form of a request for declaratory
judgment; second, the landowner may pursue a curative amendment,
and if the governing body refuses it, he or she may commence a new
challenge, together with the non-zoning matter, to the zoning hearing
board under section 913.1, thus providing the landowner with two
chances to attack the validity of the ordinance; third, the landowner
may submit a request to the governing body, and from a denial thereof
appeal to court under section 1004(3) consolidating therewith the
ancillary non-zoning issues.
42
In choosing a forum, therefore, the landowner must weigh the
convenience of -settling all matters within a single proceeding against
the opportunity to have more than one chance to establish a record in
two separate hearings.
141. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10913.1 (1972). In such a case, however, the
board has no power to pass upon the nonzoning issues; it merely takes evidence
concerning these issues and makes a record thereon. Id.
142. Section 1004(2) (b) specifically provides that if an application for a zoning
permit or approval is made and denied, and the landowner challenges the validity of
the ordinance upon which the application for permit or approval was denied by
submitting a challenge and request for curative amendment to the governing body,
the time within which he may seek review of the denial based on ancillary issues
shall not begin to run until the request to the governing body is disposed of. Id.
§ 11004(2) (b).
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F. The Nature of Relief
The final consideration as to choice of forum in validity challenges
is the different forms of relief available from each forum. Once a
challenge is appealed from either body to a court, the nature of the
available relief is clear. 43 However, there are two fundamental dif-
ferences in the relief available from a zoning hearing board or a
governing body in the first instance. First, !the relief which may be
granted by the governing body is fixed and certain. It is limited to
the terms of the proposed curative amendment prepared by the chal-
lenger and submitted with the application.' 44 If the governing body
adopts any other amendment, the landowner has the option of accepting
it, or of refusing to accept it, and appealing the challenge to court
where the alternative amendment adopted by the governing body will
not be considered.
145
On the other hand, the effect of the relief available from a zoning
hearing board is not clear. There is no specific statutory provision
indicating the powers of a zoning hearing board in this area. It would
seem logical that if an ordinance is found to be invalid by the zoning
hearing board, and the decision is not appealed to court by the munici-
pality or by protesters, then the zoning hearing board would be the
body to grant relief. Certainly, a challenger who is successful before
the zoning hearing board ought not be required to appeal the favorable
decision to a court in order to obtain relief on it. However, the logic
raises other questions. For example, what are the limits of the zoning
hearing board's power to set reasonable restrictions on the proposed
development? If there is a dispute as to the reasonableness of the re-
strictions imposed, will an appeal remove the entire case to court, or
will it only involve the restrictions questioned, leaving the landowner
still at the mercy of the body whose restrictions were appealed? There
are few answers to these questions, and only court decisions will
143. In Ellick, the court explained at great length the function of a court in
granting relief on appeals involving validity challenges. The court noted that
definitive relief must be granted in order to prevent the inequity which would result
when a landowner who is successful is prohibited from the reasonable development
of his or her land. 17 Pa. Cmwlth. at 415-16, 333 A.2d at 246, citing Casey v. Zoning
Hearing Bd.,.... Pa -... , 328 A.2d 464, 469 (1974). The court may disapprove the
plan presented by the landowner, or approve it in full or in part. See notes 59-66 and
accompanying text supra. However, the opinion indicated that it would be improper
for the courts to modify the plans or formulate restrictions. Therefore, the matter
can be referred back to the municipality while the court retains jurisdiction until the
case is settled. 17 Pa. Cmwlth. at 416, 333 A.2d at 246-47.
144. See notes 59-63 & 90-91 and accompanying text snpra.
145. See Gorski v. Township of Skippack, 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 346, 339 A.2d 624
(1975).
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establish the parameters of the zoning hearing board's power to grant
relief.
Second, the relief available from a governing body, if granted
in the form of the adoption of a curative amendment, cannot be ap-
pealed. The municipality, of course, cannot challenge its own ordinance
and protesters, as discussed above, may not appeal the rezoning. As
stated in Raum v. Board of Supervisors of Tredyffrin Township,48
As a practical matter, many rezonings occur upon the request of
a landowner, and these rezonings are not invalid so long as they
do not amount to spot zoning or special legislation, and they
otherwise conform with the spirit of the comprehensive plan.
147
Any determination by a zoning hearing board as to validity, how-
ever, will be appealable by protesters. 14 A landowner, therefore, who
anticipates success before the zoning hearing board or governing body
should, if there is any chance of protesters, choose to file the challenge
with the governing body under section 1004(1) (b).
IV. CONCLUSION
In commencing a validity challenge, two matters must 'be initially
considered before the challenge is commenced. First, the challenge must
be in proper form, and carefully thought out so as to furnish the basis
of jurisdiction over the challenge. Second, the 1972 amendments to the
MPC have introduced a choice of forums in which to file a validity
challenge. As we have attempted to show in this article, the choice by
the landowner to file his challenge before the zoning hearing board or
before the governing body is neither a neutral choice nor a choice
without major procedural consequences.
146. 20 Pa. Cmwlth. 426, 342 A.2d 450 (1975).
147. Id. at 430, 342 A.2d at 455.
148. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11007 (1972).
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